Official Incident Documentation
Offshore Incident Report & Analysis
Compiled from crew accounts, communication logs, and a formal debrief held in Newport RI, at 16:00 on November 8, 2025.
Moderated by Bruce Brown with delivery crew Buster Pike (captain), Evan Spaulding, Zach Doerr, Dylan Flack, Sam Gryska, and vessel owner Brandon Flack in attendance.
On November 3, 2025, the crew of SV Magic Bus departed Stonington, Connecticut for the Bahamas. Over the next four days the vessel experienced progressive flooding, worsening weather, multiple mechanical failures, structural damage, and eventual downflooding into the port hull. Despite these escalating events, the five sailors aboard executed calm decision-making, disciplined teamwork, and timely communication with the United States Coast Guard, culminating in an orderly abandonment and successful rescue.
Approximately one week after rescue, the vessel was spotted floating inverted with the port rudder skeg missing, consistent with undetected impact damage likely sustained while sailing at 10+ knots in rough, noisy conditions. The intact saildrives and keels suggest a submerged object struck the skeg area, compromising aft tabbing and creating a reverse scoop effect that drew water into the engine room while underway, with observed flooding reaching 30″ above the waterline.
The reverse scoop combined with compromised tabbing could easily generate inflow rates exceeding the approximately 7000 gph of spare bilge pumps deployed, explaining the progressive flooding despite aggressive pumping efforts. Inspecting this area would have been extremely difficult in a flooded engine compartment, the likely damage location behind the rudder post is an incredibly hard access point for any adult-size person even in dry conditions, and attempting such inspection would have placed crew at significant risk.
The successful outcome demonstrates the value of preparation, seamanship, and clarity under pressure. Three of the five crew had completed Safety at Sea seminars, and all five possessed significant offshore experience or the physical resilience to endure demanding conditions at sea.
Issued approx. one week prior to incident:
“All mariners be advised a containership has reported they lost thirty-three containers overboard at this approximate position. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution and report any container sightings to U.S. Coast Guard Sector North Carolina at 833-732-8628.”
Reported Location: Lat: 36° 12′ 36″ Lon: -068° 39′ 54″
Note: This location is within 25 miles of where SV Magic Bus was eventually abandoned.
Weather Window & Hull Prep
Forecast models highlighted a promising weather window for early in the week, prompting final readiness checks. The bottom was cleaned by the dive crew and confirmed that all through-hulls were clear and unobstructed.
Final Preparations
Crew members arrived throughout the afternoon to load gear, stow provisions, complete rig checks, and refuel in Mystic. Safety gear was verified, the offshore watch schedule established, and weather models (EC and NAM) reviewed and confirmed a suitable departure window for late Monday night or early Tuesday morning.
20:38 EST
Departure from Stonington, CT (20:38)
SV Magic Bus departed in clearing post-frontal conditions under a fresh westerly breeze. The boat performed well on a deep reach. Top speeds of 13-15 knots were recorded, and the crew settled quickly into the watch rotation.
~16:00 EST
Initial Flooding Detected (~16:00)
A port-side engine alarm prompted inspection of the compartment. Water was found rising above the engine block. Immediate actions included:
These combined measures slowed the ingress, and the water stabilized near the natural waterline inside the engine room.
07:00 EST
Gulf Stream Entry
Conditions eased sufficiently to allow entry into the engine compartment. Crew members entered the space wearing scuba masks, diving into the flooded port engine room to close multiple valves. They successfully closed:
Flooding persisted, suggesting the leak source was not a seacock or hose.
Routing Decisions
With the vessel already south of the Stream, returning north meant beating into strengthening headwinds. Consensus was formed to continue south toward North Carolina or Florida. The crew and the shore support team agreed this offered the best safety margin.
Southwest winds strengthened beyond forecast. Pumps were estimated to be moving approximately 7,500 GPH in total, yet were unable to gain ground. The generator grew increasingly intermittent, and the crew began conserving power by shutting down the refrigerator and freezer.
18:00 – 23:00
Winds backed southwest and intensified. Seas built steadily. Overheating and overload faults continued on the generator, requiring load reduction. Pumps maintained the water level but never reduced it.
01:55 EST
A sudden report marked the failure of the port jib sheet. The flogging sail struck the starboard cabin-top hatch, partially tearing it from its frame. shortly afterward the jib clew fitting failed. The remaining sail was furled, leaving the vessel under bare poles, struggling to maintain safe orientation in rising seas.
02:00 – 02:30 EST
Attempts to start the starboard engine were unsuccessful. With both engines down and the mainsail secured, the vessel lost reliable steerage. Breaking seas began striking the stern and intermittently washing into the engine-hatch openings required for pumping.
The crew recognized the combination of no propulsion, severe weather, intermittent generator operation, and sustained flooding necessitated early communication with rescue authorities while systems remained online.
02:37 EST
First Coast Guard Contact (via Starlink Voice)
A Pan-Pan urgency message was transmitted using the Starlink system. The call was routed from USCG Sector Norfolk to USCG Sector North Carolina. The report included persistent flooding, both engines inoperative, loss of steerage, heavy sea state, and no AIS contacts visible.
03:10 – 03:40 EST
~03:10 — Flooding Overtops Port-Hull Cabin Sole
Inspection of the port hull revealed water approximately 18 inches above the cabin floor. This confirmed downflooding into interior spaces, loss of compartmentalization, and an unrecoverable condition. The decision to abandon ship was made immediately.
03:13 — Evacuation Plan Initiated
A message with the shore crew showed the shift to a full evacuation plan. Starlink was unplugged for the raft.
03:20–03:40 — Life Raft Deployment
The life raft was deployed on the windward side. Essential gear was transferred. Each crew member boarded in sequence as waves broke over the stern.
03:36 EST
Official Distress Signal
A formal Mayday call was issued by both the boat (prior to final disconnect) and the shore crew to alert USCG authorities of the abandonment.
Coast Guard C-130 aircraft scrambled as the first part of the rescue plan and took off.
Coast Guard spots the life raft and confirms at least one crew member onboard.
Helicopter launches, en route to USS George H. W. Bush for refueling support.
Using the VHF radio dropped by the C-130, all five survivors were confirmed safe.
Rescue swimmer deployed to begin extraction.
All crew safely in the helicopter.
Survivors flown to the aircraft carrier for evaluation, warm clothing, and stabilization.
The crew was flown to Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City. During intake and debrief, they were informed that the EPIRBs had not transmitted when manually activated and only triggered when the lifejackets inflated or when devices were immersed upon leaving the life raft.
“After taking the time to review the passage from a place of stability and with far more clarity than was possible on night three in 45-plus knots of wind, 15-foot seas, and a boat taking on water while running on half of its systems, we compiled the following suggestions and improvements for future offshore sailors to consider. None of these would have guaranteed a different outcome, but they are observations we feel are worth sharing.”
Looking back, the Pan-Pan call could reasonably have been made as much as 30 hours sooner. At the time, the flooding appeared manageable, and the crew believed the issue was solvable without assistance.
Engine-Room Hatches Should Be Mechanically Fastened Before Offshore Departure. Even though these hatches sit well above the waterline (~20″ inches), securing them mechanically would have significantly reduced internal downflooding once the engine room filled.
It was invaluable that 3 of the 5 crew members had completed the comprehensive US Sailing Safety at Sea full day course. This preparation directly contributed to the calm, organized response and effective teamwork during the crisis.
The EPIRB passed its pre-departure test but did not transmit when manually activated. It only transmitted after being submerged during crew extraction. It was flashing and beeping inside the raft, and the crew reasonably assumed it was functioning. Checking both test and battery expiration date is essential.
Personal Locator Beacons Must Be Activated Before Raft Departure When Possible. All crew carried personal locator beacons, but they were not triggered because activation occurred only upon raft departure. Earlier activation may not always be feasible, but it’s important to understand how activation timing affects tracking. Additionally, the automatic activation on lifejacket inflation failed for at least two crew members, likely due to ribbon tension issues, reinforcing the need for manual activation.
SPOT Tracker Was the Primary Device Used by the Coast Guard to Locate the Crew. The SPOT performed reliably and was ultimately the device SAR used for positive location.
Starlink Mini Was Invaluable, With Improvements Noted for Future Use. One improvement surfaced afterward: The unit was plugged into a switch with Off / Auto / On, where Auto shut down at 10.8 volts. Switching to On would have bypassed that cutoff. That “On” position should be clearly labeled EMERGENCY MODE on future voyages. Additionally, a simple waterproof connection that allows the unit to run either from the house bank or from a portable backup battery would add redundancy. Notably, the crew did take the Starlink into the life raft, and with a portable jump pack, would have been able to communicate with shore if needed.
Once enough pumps were running, the expectation was that the water level in the port engine room would begin to drop to a manageable level. Instead, it never fell below the external waterline, which meant the space was behaving differently from a normal leak. Earlier joint troubleshooting between the crew and shore-side advisors might have helped identify this behavior sooner.
With hindsight, opening the exhaust discharge hose, creating a controlled 4-inch outlet a couple inches above the waterline, might have allowed the engine room to drain outward, preventing water from rising high enough to spill into the living spaces. This is purely hindsight; it’s not an obvious decision in the moment.
Crash pumps and portable pumps repeatedly overheated as debris entered the system. A strainer was installed during the response but broke under load, underscoring how important durable filtration is in a flooding compartment. Future crews may benefit from robust secondary strainers, mesh screens, and planned manual clearing intervals.
Anything That Reduces Internal Flooding Buys Exponential Time. Small improvements, secured hatches, pump strainers, better drainage paths, reduced electrical load, can dramatically increase safety margins when a hull is compromised.
Insurance requirements prevented the vessel from rounding Cape Hatteras before November 1, which removed earlier departure windows. Forecasts from multiple models indicated 25–30 knots for two limited periods over five days. Actual conditions differed substantially from those forecasts, with winds reaching 45–50 knots for extended periods and shifting farther south than projected. This gap between expected and observed weather played a meaningful role in the challenges that followed.
Overboard repairs or hull-leakage inspections were not an option. Even when the breeze eased, the sea state remained near 10 feet, making any attempt to assess or repair damage from beneath the hull life-threatening.
A fully charged, waterproof handheld VHF brought into the life raft failed to operate (emitting only static) when needed. Redundant communication devices are critical.
Incident Moderator & Safety Expert
Bruce Brown is a distinguished marine safety expert and a USCG-approved instructor for 100-Ton Licenses and STCW in-water safety training. He served as Chairman of the US Sailing Independent Review Panel for the Aegean accident (2012 Newport to Ensenada Race) and is a long-standing US Sailing Safety at Sea Moderator. His leadership roles include serving as President of the United States Marine Safety Association and as a member of the US Sailing National Faculty. Bruce specializes in crisis management, crew overboard symposiums, and forensic incident analysis, bringing decades of safety expertise to the debriefing process.
Person In Charge
Buster is a lifelong sailor with deep experience across dinghy and keelboat racing, along with an extensive offshore résumé. He has completed numerous deliveries as both captain and crew, including passages from New England to the Caribbean, a full Transatlantic, and routes such as San Diego to Panama and various additional coastal and offshore legs. Professionally, he has worked as a race and charter captain throughout New England and the Caribbean. He holds CPR and First Aid certification from the American Red Cross (exp. 12/14/26), an International Offshore Safety at Sea certification (exp. 3/10/28), and instructor credentials from US Sailing as both a Basic Keelboat Instructor (exp. 11/21/27) and a Small Boat Level 1 Instructor (exp. 9/29/28).
Naval Architect
Zach is a 2024 graduate of Webb Institute with a B.S. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, and he currently works with Wyspa Tech and SDK Structures doing both recreational and race-boat design and engineering. He has compiled a strong record offshore, earning overall division wins in the Newport–Bermuda Race, the Bermuda Shorthanded Return, the Ida Lewis Distance Race, and the Around Long Island Regatta. His certifications include CPR / First Aid and an International Offshore Safety at Sea credential valid through 2026.
Marine Engineer
Evan is a lifelong sailor with racing experience across dinghies, multihulls, and keelboats, backed by significant offshore mileage that includes two Newport–Bermuda Races and their return deliveries. He works professionally as a Naval Architect and Marine Engineer. His certifications include Safety at Sea — International Offshore, CPR / First Aid through the Red Cross, and Small Boat Level 1 Instructor, along with a B.S. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.
Collegiate Sailor
Dylan is a collegiate sailor at Wake Forest University with a lifelong background racing Optis, C420s, and keelboats. He has four summers of small-boat coaching experience in southeastern Connecticut and has spent over a year living aboard the Magic Bus between the Exumas and Connecticut. He holds CPR / First Aid certification through the Red Cross and is a certified Small Boat Level 1 Instructor.
Computer Science Grad
Sam is from Marion, Massachusetts, and recently graduated Cum Laude from URI with a Computer Science Degree. He grew up racing and coaching sailing and spent much of his younger years traveling and working on sailboats, including a summer working in the Alaskan Salmon Fishery. He plans to enroll into the Navy OCS program this coming spring to work as a Naval Officer. Certifications: Level 1 Instructor, CPR/First Aid Certified.
Owner
Brandon is a lifelong sailor with a broad background across the marine industry and competitive racing. He has worked as a J World instructor, a North Sails representative, and later served as Brand Manager for Musto North America as part of his responsibilities at Atlantic Marketing, where he is now a partner representing leading manufacturers throughout the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. He previously served as President of the NMRA and as a board member of the NMMA, contributing to industry standards and advocacy. Over the years, Brandon has launched several marine and tech ventures and was the owner of the Magic Bus. He brings decades of practical seamanship, racing experience, and industry leadership, and is CPR / First Aid certified.
Buster Pike recounts the rescue and the crew’s decision-making process.
Dylan Flack shares his perspective on the harrowing night and rescue operation.
Dylan Flack returns to his alma mater to discuss offshore safety and the incident.
PORTSMOUTH, Va. — The Coast Guard rescued five people after their vessel began taking on water 260 nautical miles offshore Cape Hatteras, Thursday.
Coast Guard Sector North Carolina Command Center watchstanders received a distress call from the crew of the sailing vessel Magic Bus, reporting their vessel was taking on water and all five people aboard were abandoning ship into their life raft.
The Coast Guard diverted the Cutter Angela McShan and launched an Air Station Elizabeth City HC-130 Hercules aircraft crew and an MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter crew. The HC-130 crew located the life raft and confirmed everyone was stable.
| September 2022: | Both Volvo 130 saildrives were replaced with Volvo 150 saildrives, including new bellows and securing plates. |
|---|---|
| October 2025: | Both engines were replaced entirely. Upgraded to Beta 60 engines. Saildrives confirmed compatible. |
| Sea Trials: | Following installation, three sea trials were conducted over the week prior to departure. |
| November 3 (Departure): | Engines underwent final inspection, including oil and filter changes. Bellows inspected for flexibility and seal integrity. |
Detailed schematic of all thru-hull locations on SV Magic Bus.
Download Thru-Hull Locations Overview (PDF)
Generated for documentation and safety analysis purposes.
Stonington, CT • Cape Hatteras • USCG Sector NC
Sounds like a mostly sunk container collision? These things happen too often. Why can’t shippers be required to have automatically deployable tethered gps devices to broadcast AIS location if they are near the surface. My Dad’s boat was sunk by a suspected container off the coast of SoCal years ago and I know there are more.
Randy Brand, December 24, 2025
Thank you for sharing the lessons learned.
Chris Patrick, December 24, 2025